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ESTATES TAIL IN MISSOURI 1
The recent case of Gray v. Ward' calls attention to the prob-
lems which arise in the application of the Missouri statute8
abolishing estates tail as created by the statute De Donis Con-
ditionalibus' It is believed that all of these problems have not
been solved in the decisions of the Missouri Court and this
study is undertaken to determine what principles have been
adopted, and what further principles should control the Court
in the application of this statute of entails.
I.
HISTORY OF ESTATES TAIL IN MISSOURI.
At the beginning of the last century, estates tail were
common in the United States, and common recoveries were
not unknown as means of docking the entail.' But the feudal
atmosphere enveloping them does not harmonize with modern
notions of lard ownership,' and by statute in most of the United
Stated they have been much modified. The most common of
these statutes convert the estate tail into a fee simple; some
merely provide readier methods of docking the entail. In a
few jurisdictions, an attempt is made to preserve the entailing
feature, for a time felt to be consistent with changed forms of
land tenure, one generation. The policy of such legislation
has been sharply criticized,7 but it has the virtue of partially
1. This article first appeared in VII Illinois Law Review at page 355,
and is reprinted here with the permission of the editors of that magazine.
2. (1911) 234 Missouri 291.
3. The present Missouri statute is the same as that which now pre-
vails in Illinois, Arkansas, Vermont and Colorado and similar to that of
Ohio, New Jersey, Connecticut and New Mexico.
4. 13 Edward I.
5. Williams Real Property (17th Int. Ed.) 121; Sauder's Le8see v.
Morningstar (179 ) 1 Yeates (Pa.) 313; Corbin v. Healy (1838) 20 Pick.
514, 517.
6. "The entailment of estates is obnoxious to the policy of our
laws." Lamm, J., in Cox v. Jones (1910) 229 Mo. 52.
7. Dembitz, Land Titles 117-125.
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effectuating the intention of the creator of the estate to offset
the uncertain mischief of making the land unmarketable for a
period. It is only this last class of statutes which now presents
the difficult problems in connection with estates tail.
Where the entailment is to some degree preserved, the
statutes have followed either the New Jersey statute creating a
remainder in fee in the children of the donee,' or the first Mis-
souri statute giving the remainder in fee simple to the first
taker after the donee. 9 Since Missouri has at various times had
both statutes, both will be considered in the present study.
Under the Spanish law which prevailed in Missouri as a
part of the Louisiana Territory, estates tail were of course un-
known. When in 1816 the territorial legislature substituted
for the Spanish law the common law and appropriate statutes
of the British Parliament enacted prior to the fourth year of
James I (1606), it was expressly excepted that
"The doctrine of entails shall never be allowed, and in all cases when
any real estate shall be entailed, the whole right and interest of, in and to
the same, shall vest in fee simple in the person having the first reversion or
remainder in the said estate, after the life estate is determined in said es-
tate. "10
The interpretation of this statute is now a matter only of
academic interest, no cases having arisen under it. But it may
be observed that the inaccurate phraseology, in admitting that
land may be entailed," seems to imply that De Donis was not
excluded from the body of English law adopted. 2 Does "the
person having the first reversion or remainder in the said es-
tate" mean the heir of the body of the first donee, taking per
formam doni, or might it not refer to the owner of the remainder
after the estate tail?
8. Doty v. Teller (1891) 54 N. J. L. 163. Ohio, Connecticut and
New Mexico have copied the New Jersey statute. New Jersey in 1784
recognized "entailment in the first degree only."
9. The Missouri statute was copied in Illinois in 1827 (see notes to
Professor Kales' article, 13 Yale Law Journal, 267); in Arkansas in 1837
(R. S. 1837, p. 189, c. 31, § 5); in Vermont in 1840 (R. S. 1840, c. 59, §
1); and in Colorado in 1867 (R. S. 1867, c. 17, § 5). See 1 Stimson, Amer.
Stat. Law § 1313.
10. 1 Mo. Terr. Laws, p. 436.
11. The preamble of the statute of 1825 bears this out-"in cases
where any person would now.be seised in fee tail." But see Frame v.
Humphreys (1901) 164 Mo. 336.
12. Zane, Determinable Fees, 17 Harv. Law Review 297, 305.
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This awkward statute of 1816 was superseded by the stat-
ute of 1825 which in terms applied to existing as well as to fu-
ture estates tail. Unless the later statute is to be taken as a
legislative interpretation of the earlier one, changing no prop-
erty rights thereunder, its constitutionality may be doubted
insofar as it affected existing estates tail, as a violation of the
provision in the constitution of 1820 prohibiting any law "re-
trospective in its operation,' 3 and as a deprivation of property
not according to "the law of the land,"' 4 which means "without
due process of law."I 5 The inartistic draughting of the statute
of 1825 made it apply to cases where "by the common law"'"
estates tail should exist, but obviously "the common law"
must here include De Donis. In such cases, the donee or first
taker in tail is given a life estate, with remainder "in fee simple
absolute to the person or persons to whom the estate tail would,
on the death of the first donee in tail, first pass according to the
course of the common law, by virtue of such conveyance.'" 7
In the revision of 1835, this statute was condensed with-
out any change in its effect.'" In the revision of 1845, the New
Jersey statute, which was probably responsible for the first
Missouri statute, was copied more nearly completely, and the
result is very different from the statute which for a time it
superseded, though this difference has been neglected by the
Missouri court in several cases. 1" This new statute applied
13. Const. of 1820, Art. XIII, 17.
14. Const. of 1820, Art. XIII, 9. On the violation of a "due pro-
cess" clause by such a statute as that in question, see Green v. Edwards,
(R. I., 1910) 77 Atl. 188; 24 Harvard Law Review 144-146. 1
15. Jones v. Yore 0(1897) 142 Mo. 38; Hunt v. Searcy (1902) 167
Mo. 158, 178.
16. Laws of 1825, p. 216.
17. This statute does not expressly apply to any interests after the
estate tail for the holders of such interests are not persons to whom the
estate tail would pass. But see Farrar v. Christy (1857) 24 Mo. 453, 469.
18. Laws of 1835, p. 119. The abbreviated form applied only to
future created estates, but it is hardly probable that any real estates tail
existed in 1835 unless part of the statute of 1825 be unconstitutional.
19. In Yocum v. Siler (1900) 160 Mo. 281, at 294, it is said to be
not materially different from the previous statute. And see Chiles v.
Bartleson (1855) 21 Mo. 344; Harbison v. Swan (1874) 58 Mo. 147;
Charles v. Patch (1885) 87 Mo. 450; Wood v. Kice (1890) 103 Mo. 329;
Hunter v. Patterson (1897) 142 Mo. 310, 317; Heady v. Crouse (1907) 203
Mo. 100; Summet v. Realty Co. (1907) 208 Mo. 501; Arnold v. Garth
(1901) 106 Fed. 13. The difference was also neglected in an article on
Determinable Fees, by Mr. Zane, in 17 Harvard Law Review 297.
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only to future-created estates, and limited the interest of the
donee or first taker to a life estate and provided that
"Upon the death of such grantee or devisee, the said lands and tene-
ments shall go and be vested in the children of such grantee or devisee,
equally to be divided between them as tenants in common, in fee, and if
there be only one child, then to that one, in fee, and if any child be dead,
the part which would have come to him or her, shall go to his or her is-
sue, and if there be no issue, then to his or her heirs. "20
This statute was re-enacted in 185521 with changes only in
punctuation which should not modify its sense.22 The prob-
lems arising under it are obviously different from those arising
under the previous statute, and will therefore be treated sep-
arately.
In the revision of 1865, the statute of 1825 was restored
with a slight modification in its preamble-'"where by the
common or statute law of England" 2 3-and in this form it has
remained in force since that time. 4 The history of this legisla-
tion may therefore be divided into two periods; the first cover-
ing the years between 1825 and 1845, and since 1865; the sec-
ond covering the years between 1845 and 1865. This latter
period has more than an academic interest, for cases are still
arising to which the statute of 1845 applies.
After a consideration of the situations to which one or the
other of these statutes applies, i. e., where estates tail are cre-
ated in Missouri, it will be profitable to inquire into the char-
acter of this statutory remainder, the time of its vesting and
the persons in whom it may vest. A closely related topic, the
effect of the modern statutes on the common law remainder
after the estate tail, will then be studied.
20. Laws of 1845, c. 32, § 5.
21. Laws of 1855, c. 32, § 5.
22. But see Clarkson v. Clarkson (1894) 125 Mo. 381.
23. Laws of 1865, c. 108, § 4. The revised law did not go into
effect until August 1, 1866. It did not purport to apply to existing estates
tail.
24. R. S. 1909, § 2872.
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II.
THE LIMITATION OF ESTATES TAIL.
When does the situation exist to which one or the other of
the Missouri statutes must be applied? When, under the
present statutes of construction, may a person be said to be
seised of an estate which would be an estate tail "by the com-
mon or statute law of England?"
The usual form of a limitation in tail is "to A and the heirs
of his body."25  But "heirs" is the only word of art in the
limitation, and any sufficient words of procreation may follow
-as "to A and his bodily heirs," 2" or "to A and his heirs by
B, "27 the latter being a special tail. A fee tail may also be
created by implication, as in the following cases-'"to A and
his heirs, but if A should die without issue to B and his heirs,"
and "to A for life, and if A die without issue to B and his
heirs," 2S-but this implication depends upon the indefinite-
ness of the failure of issue on which the gift over is made,29 and
since 1845 the statute requires this failure of issue to be con-
strued as a definite failure 0 with the result that in Missouri
25. Challis, Real Property (3rd ed.) 294. In Littleton, the usual
form is, "to A and to the heirs of his body begotten."
26. Hall v. French (1901) 165 Mo. 430; Chew v. Kellar (1902) 171
Mo. 215; Utter v. Sidman (1902) 170 Mo. 284; Clarkson v. Clarkson (1894)
125 Mo. 381; Donnell v. Mateer (1840) 5 Ired. Eq. 9. But see Righter v.
Forrester (1866) 1 Bush. 278; Mitchell v. Simpson (Ky., 1889) 10 S. W.
372.
27. Reed v. Lane (1894) 122 Mo. 311; Gray v. Ward (1911) 234 Mo.
291. But see Fanning v. Doan (1895) 128 Mo. 328. On the comparative
weight to be given to granting and habendum clauses see Utter v. Sidman
(1902) 170 Mo. 284.
28. Farrar v. Christy (1857) 24 Mo. 453; Chism's Admrs. v. Wil-
liams (1860) 29 Mo. 288. It is sometimes erroneously thought that the
abolition of the old estate tail should now preclude such implication. The
modern statute of entails does not, in this sense, lay down a rule of con-
struction.
29. The implication had its origin in the effort of the courts to
escape the rule against remoteness which would otherwise apply. It was
not extended to definite failures, therefore.
30. R. S.'1845, c. 32, § 6. Unlike the English statute from which
it is copied (1 Victoria, c. 26, § 29), the Missouri statute makes no excep-
tion even where a contrary intention appears. Though in terms it ap-
plies only to "remainders," it has been given a broader construction.
Faust v. Birner (1860) 30 Mo. 414; Naylor v. Godman (1891) 109 Mo. 543;
Yocum v. Siler (1900) 160 Mo. 281; Gannon v. Albright (1904) 183 Mo.
238.
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an estate tail is no longer created by implication in such a
case.3 Similarly, the course of taking being changed by stat-
ute, no reason exists for creating estates tail on the doctrine of
cy pres, which obtains as to devises, since that doctrine is
never applied except as it accomplishes an otherwise impossible
succession."2 Closely resembling an implied estate tail is the
somewhat anomalous case of a limitation "to A and the heirs of
the body of an ancestor whose heir by lineal descent A is," in
which A takes an estate tail transmissible as though the an-
cestor had held it;"3 and this is extended in Mandeville's Case4
to a limitation in remainder to the heirs of the body of one to
whom the holder of the particular estate bears no relation.
So it would seem that a limitation "to the heirs of the body
of A," with no prior estate, creates an estate tail, transmissible
as from A. Unless A is dead at the time, such limitation must
be by way of use or contingent remainder.
The complete abolition of the Rule in Shelley's Case in
184511 further restricts the application of the statutes abolishing
estates tail. A limitation to A for life, with remainder to the
heirs of his body, will, since 1845, create a life estate in A, with
31. Yocum v. Siler (1900) 160 Mo. 281; Yocum v. Parker (1904)
134 Fed. 205; Gannon v. Albright (1904) 183 Mo. 238; Gannon v. Pauk
(1906) 200 Mo. 75. But see Harbison v. Swan (1874) 58 Mo. 147. Cf.
Nott v. Fitzgibbon (1900) 107 Tenn. 54. In Turney v. Sparks (1901) 88
Mo. App. 363, the possible implication of a fee tail was not noticed.
32. The typical case for applying the doctrine is in a limitation to
A for life, remainder to his unborn son for life, remainder to the children
of that unborn son in tail either successively or as tenants in common
with cross-remainders, where as a result of its application the unborn son
of A takes a fee tail. Pitt v. Jackson (1786) 2 Bro. C. C. 51. The doc-
trine is extended to an indefinite series of life estates in Parfiltt v. Hum-
ber (1867) L. R. 4 Eq. 443. See Gray, Perpetuities (2nd ed.) §§ 643-
670; 17 Harvard Law Review 559.
33. Challis, Real Property (3rd ed.) 298.
34. Co. Litt. 26 b. See Leake, Property in Land (2nd ed.) 136.
35. It was abolished in Missouri as to devises in 1825-R. S. 1825,
chapter on wills, § 18, p. 794; R. S. 1835, p. 620; Riggins v. McClellon
(1859) 28 Mo. 23, 29-at least where the later gift is to the "children or
heirs or right heirs" of the taker of the prior life estate. Strictly this
statute does not apply to a later gift to heirs of the body, for a gift to
children of one to whom a previous life estate is given does not call for an
application of the rule even in a devise unless the word is clearly intended
to mean heirs of the body. And since the Rule of Shelley's Case is not
one of construction, 1 Tiffany, Real Property 313, a devise might have
been made between 1825 and 1845 to which the rule would have applied.
In 1845 (R. S. 1845, c. 32, § 7) the rule was completely abolished as to
heirs of the body as well as to right heirs, in both wills and deeds. Tesson
v. Newman (1876) 62 Mo. 198.
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a remainder in the heirs of his body who will take as purchasers.
But in Emerson v. Hughes37 such a limitation was held to create
an estate tail upon which the statute of entails acted at once.3"
Even where the Rule in Shelley's Case is in force, it would seem
folly to apply it so as to create an estate tail which the statute
of entails would at once dissolve into the interests which would
have existed but for the operation of the rule.39 By the Rule
in Wild's Case,"0 a devise to A and his children creates an
estate tail in A, if he at the time has no children.
III.
THE STATUTORY REMAINDER.
A. Under the statute of 1825.
Having determined that the statute of entails applies to a
particular case, what is its effect? Does the statute operate on
an estate tail of which the grantee actually becomes seised?
36. The statute of 1845 (R. S. 1845, c. 32, § 7) simply provided that
they should take as purchasers. So the statute of 1855 (R. S., c. 32, § 7)%
But the statute of 1865 (R. S. 1865, c. 108, § 6) provided that they shoul6
take as purchasers in fee simple. R.S. 1909, § 2874. Under the statute-
of 1845, it would seem that they would take as purchasers in fee tail, sub-
ject to the statute abolishing fees tail, under the rule in Mandeville's Case.
already noted in the text. Leake, Property in Land (2nd ed.) 132, 136.
"To A for life, remainder to the heirs of his body,' would therefore read,,
"to A for life, remainder to the heirs of his body for life, remainder as to,
the share of each heir to the children of that heir in fee." The last re--
mainder being too remote, it is improbable that this result would be'
reached, though it seems to follow logically. In Utter v. Sidman (1902)
170 Mo. 284, the statute of entails may have applied, though under the-
interpretation put on the habendum the point now discussed would seent
to have been presented. See also Miller v. Dunn (1904) 184 Mo. 318;
Shepperd v. Fisher (1907) 206 Mo. 208.
37. (1892) 110 Mo. 627; a proper result was reached in this case.
38. Accord, Godman v. Simmons (1892) 113 Mo. 122. Contra on
this point, Waddell v. Waddell (1889) 99 Mo. 338; Tindall v. Tindall
(1902) 167 Mo. 218; Clark v. Sires (1906) 193 Mo. 502; Heady v. Crouse
(1907) 203 Mo. 100; cf. Garth v. Arnold (1893) 115 Federal 468, 474.
39. Lehndorf v. Cope (1887) 122 Ill. 317; Griswold v. Hicks (1890),
132 Ill. 494, 500. But see Kales, Future Interests in Illinois., § 131.
40. 6 Coke, 17. In Allen v. Claybrook (1874) 58 Mo. 124, children
were in existence at the time of the devise. Kinney v. Matthews (1879)
69 Mo. 520, was a case of a deed to one "and all her children she has noVw
or ever will have;" the court talked about its creating an estate tail, but it
does not seem to have been so held. Carr v. Estill (Ky., 1855) 16 B.
Monroe 309, in which Wild'8 Case was not followed, was cited with ap-
proval.
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Or does it change the effect of the words which would have cre-
ated an estate tail, to make them create a life estate followed
by a remainder in fee simple? The statute of 1825 is explicit
to the latter effect, for it says "instead of becoming seised in
fee tail." The statute of 1845 though it says "shall become
seised," later corrects it with, "such conveyance or devise
shall vest." And the statute of 1865 says that the donee
''shall become seised" of a different estate, as a result of the con-
veyance. These statutes operate "only to cause one form of
language to be equivalent to another appropriate to confer the
statutory estates. "41 Such a result seems necessary, though
in one case it means the remoteness and consequent invalidity
of the statutory remainder-a devise to A for life, remainder
to B, the unborn son of A, and the heirs of his body. Unless
exempted by the statute of entails by force of the declaration
that "the remainder shall pass," the rule against perpetuities
would defeat all except the life estates in A and B. 42
No difficulty arises with respect to the life estate in the
first taker-it is an ordinary life estate with the usual inci-
dents.43 But what is the nature of the estate or interest of
the "person or persons to who the estate tail would on the death
of the first grantee, devisee, or donee, in tail, first pass, accord-
ing to the course of the common law," and upon what princi-
ples must the identity of such person or persons, be deter-
mined?
Whether the heir of the body of a tenant in tail under De
Donis, takes as a purchaser substituted for the ancestor per
formam doni,14 or by descent from the ancestor, 45 he is not con-
41. This view is supported by the result of Burris v. Page (1849)
12 Mo. 358; and see Zane on Determinable Fees, 17 Harvard Law Re-
view 297, 309. But see Spencer v. Spruell (1902) 196 Il1. 119, and re-
marks on that case in Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, § 115.
42. The question might have been raised in Brown v. Rogers (1894)
125 Mo. 392. Lockridge v. Mace (1891) 109 Mo. 162, and Shepperd v.
Fisher (1907) 206 Mo. 208 would hold the devise bad as a whole. Sed
.quaere. Whitby v. Mitchell, (1890) 44 Ch. Div. 85, might apply to the
.case in the text. But see Gray, Perpetuities (2nd ed.) §§ 298a et seq.
No reason is perceived why the statute should not apply as well to estates
:in remainder as to estates in possession.
43. Burris v. Page (1849) 12 Mo. 358. Note that under the Ohio
statute the donee's estate has all the qualities of an estate tail during the
donee's lifetime. Pollock v. Speidel (1875) 27 Ohio St. 86.
44. 1 Tiffany, Real Property 68.
45. Challis, Real Property (3rd ed.) 266-7.
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ceived to have any interest during the life of the ancestor. In
addition to restraining the alienation of conditional fees simple,
De Donis prescribed the succession on the death of the tenant,
but the prospect of this succession could create no interest in
advance, for nemo est haeres viventis. It would seem obvious.
then that under the statute of 1825, the statutory remainder
must be contingent during the life of the "first grantee, de-
visee, or donee"-it falls within Fearne's fourth class of con-
tingent remainders, being "limited to a person not ascer-
tained." 4  Numerous decisions in Missouri have upheld such
a definition of a contingent remainder,47 and the New York
statutory definition 4 has never been consciously applied in
this state. It is the condition precedent incorporated into the
description of the remainderman which should make this stat-
utory remainder contingent, if the accepted English definition
is to apply, and this is the law in Arkansas49 and Vermont. 50
It is a more difficult task to identify the remainderman.
"According to the course of the common law," the heirs of the
body were determined by such of the canons of descent as were
applicable, and those canons named the eldest son as heir, pre-
ferring the males to females,5' for the law of descents of fee
simple names heirs of the body as well as heirs generally. 52 A
change in the law of descents of fees simple does not necessarily
include the succession to estates tail, and the earlier cases in-
dicate a tendency to exempt estates tail from the operation of
modern statutes of descent though the terms of such statutes
were broad enough to include them." But a court may well
46. 1 Fearne, Contingent Remainders 9.
47. Emison v. Whittlesey (1874) 55 Mo. 254; Delassus v. Gatewood.
(1880) 71 Mo. 371; Tindall v. Tindall (1902) 167 Mo. 218; Heady v.
Crouse (1907) 203 Mo. 100; Shepperd v. Fisher (1907) 206 Mo. 208;
Lich v. Lich (1900) 158 Mo. App. 400. But see Frame v. Humphreys.
(1901) 164 Mo. 336.
48. N. Y. Laws of 1896, c. 547, § 30; Gray, Perpetuities (2nd ed.),
§ 107; the New York definition was adopted without statute in Illinois,,
Boatman v. Boatman (1902) 198 11. 414; Chapin v. Nott (1903) 203 Ill..
341; but these cases are now overruled. Galladay v. Knock (1908) 235,
Ill. 412. See 3 Il. Law Review 375.
49. Horsley v. Hilburn (1884) 44 Ark. 458.
50. In re Well's Estate (1897) 69 Vt. 388.
51. 1 Cooley's Blackstone 446.
52. Williams, Real Property (17th ed.) 259-60.
53, Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, § 118.
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'hesitate to conclude that primogeniture has been perpetuated
even to this extent. 4 Must the words "according to the course
of the common law" be read literally? In the preamble of the
statute in which it first appeared,55 "the common law" had
been used to include De Donis, and in the most recent statute,
the phrase being, "by the common or statute law of England,"
without a similarly liberal interpretation so much of the phrase
is senseless. If in one place "the common law" must neces-
'sarily include a statute such as De Donis, may it not in another
,place in the same act include the statute of descents? This
'interpretation, though not literal, is not shockingly violent since
-the Statute of Descents of 182511 devolved the "title to any
real estate of inheritance," and it need not be extended to
prevent the designation of special heirs of the body, as in what
under De Donis would have been a fee tail male or female, or
a fee tail special." The only alternative, if this argument for
,a liberal construction be inacceptable,*is to say that primo-
,geniture still prevails as to the statutory remainder substituted
ifor the estate tail.5 6
Examination of the decisions under this statute of 1825,
;and the similar statutes of 1835 and 1865, does not, unfor-
tunately, resolve all of the doubts which may have appeared
in the foregoing analysis.
The first case in which the statute was applied, Burris v.
Page,59 has frequently been cited for the survival of primo-
geniture. The eldest son of the donee was permitted to re-
cover in ejectment from an execution purchaser from the do-
riee's husband, but it is not shown that any of the other five
54. In Rozier v. Graham (1898) 146 Mo. 352, the court said, "There
are no mourners for the doctrine of primogeniture in this sate."
55. R. S. 1825, p. 216, Chapter on Conveyances, § 4.
56. R. S. 1825, p. 326, Chapter on Descents, § 1.
57. Reed v. Lane (1894) 122 Mo. 311. It becomes an interesting
question, whether a change in the statute of Descents would ipso facto
constitute a change in the statute of entails. See Professor Kales' article
in 13 Yale Law Journal 267, 274.
58. In Frame v. Humphreys (1901) 164 Mo. 336, the court applied
the alternative. The attention of the court has not been directed to this
fpoint in any other case in which it was involved. In Rozier v. Graham
(1898) 146 Mo. 352, the court refused to consider it. Whether Frame v.
Humphreys is law on this point, vide post.
-. 59. (1849) 12 Mo. 358.
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children of the donee survived her, 0 and the opinion is too
short to judge of the reasoning by which this result was at-
tained.
In Farrar v. Christy6 it is said that the remainder after the
fee tail was vested, "subject to be divested by the birth of is-
sue of the donee," but no issue were born. But in Harbison v.
Swan," erroneously decided under the statute of 1835 when
the will did not go into effect until 1852, the court spoke of the
remainder over as becoming vested on the death of the donee
without issue-here, one donee had issue when the estate was
created, and it is not clear when the remainder in this donee's
estate became vested. Since the statute of 1845 made the
failure of issue definite the case should have involved no con-
sideration of estates tail.
Emmerson v. Hughes"3 was improperly treated as a case
of an estate tail,6 4 and its dictum would permit a son of a daugh-
ter of the donee in tail to take, though the daughter had prev-
iously conveyed her contingent interest, and the donee was
survived by sons and other daughters. 5 So far as the case is
of authority, it must say that the statutory remainder is con-
tingent, and that the succession is to be governed by the Stat-
ute of Descents.
Reed v. Lane6 recognizes a fee tail special, and contains
a dictum that "upon the death of the grantee the fee became
vested in her children" by the special husband. The decision
is only to the effect that children by another husband cannot
take, so that the Statute of Descents is not so completely ad-
opted as to convert a fee tail special into a fee tail general,"
60. In Missouri one tenant in common cannot recover the whole
premises in ejectment against a stranger. Baber v. Henderson (1900)
156 Mo. 566. It is possible that this rule did not obtain when Burris v.
Page was decided. If primogeniture did not exist, and if others of the
donee's children survived her, the plaintiff would have been a tenant in
common.
61. (1857) 24 Mo. 453, 470.
62. (1874) 58 Mo. 147.
63. (1892) 110 Mo. 627.
64. Garth v. Arnold (1893) 115 Fed. 468, 474.
65. The dictum is repeated in Godman v. Simmons (1892) 113 Mo.
122. See remarks on Emerson v. Hughes in Garth v. Arnold (1893) 115
Federal 468, 474.
66. (1894) 122 Mo. 311.
67. This is the law in Illinois also. Cooper v. Cooper (1875) 76
Ill. 57; Welliver v. Jones (1897) 166 Ill. 80. But see Kales, Future In-
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though that result would seem to follow if "according to the
course of the common law" be read "according to the Statute
of Descents."
In Rozier v. Graham"8 specific performance of a contract to
purchase was denied to a grantee of all6" the living issue of a
donee in tail who was alive but of very advanced age, 0 because
"a contingency exists as to the heirs of" the donee. Unfor-
tunately the court added that "though a fee may vest as a
contingent remainder, it may be divested upon contingencies,
until the death of the life tenant, at which it vests finally,""
thereby casting doubt on the real ground of its decision, 2 which
may be placed on the ground of unmarketability of the title
though vested so long as other heirs might come into existence.7"
A contention for a survival of primogeniture as a result of the
statute of entails was dismissed with the observation that "how-
ever plausible the theory evolved from the mere words of the
statute, no such construction ever has been given that statute
in this state, or ever will be."
But in the very next case involving this latter question,
the prophecy was not fulfilled. For, in Frame v. Humphreys,7 1
where the donee in tail had fourteen children living at the time
of the conveyance to her, and some of them predeceased her,
leaving issue, who survived the donee, a grantee from such
grandchildren was held to be barred by a prior conveyance
terests in Illinois, § 119. But cf. Summet v. Realty Co. (1907) 208 Mo.
501.
68. (1898) 146 Mo. 352. The deed was given 17 April, 1845, but
the statute of 1845 did not go into effect until 1 August, 1845 (R. S. 1845,
§ 18, p. 698) The case is properly placed under the statute of 1835, there-
fore.
69. The fact that one child was still-born was not considered and
was probably immaterial. Marsellis v. Thalhimer (N. Y. 1830) 2 Paige
35, 21 Am. Dec. 66, holds that a still-born child must be considered as if
it had never been born or conceived.
70. While one of advanced age is legally capable of having children,
a court need not hesitate to deal with an estate where such an event is
practically impossible. Leng v. Hodges, Jac. 585. In Rozier v. Graham,
it is the possible death of living children as well as the possible birth of
other children of the donee, which makes the interest unmarketable.
71. Rozier v. Graham (1898) 146 Mo. 352, 360.
72. Professor Kales says of this case, "If the remainder was not
actually held contingent, it was at least held subject to be divested."-
Future Interests in Illinois, § 117.
73. Mitchner v. Holmes (1893) 117 Mo. 185.
74. (1901) 164 Mo. 336.
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by the father of some of the grandchildren, on the ground that
''by virtue of the grant * * * the title in fee simple ab-
solute vested in" him, the father, as the eldest son of the
donee, "subject only to the life estate of his mother." This
result is supportable without the doctrine as to primogeniture,
by saying that the donee's children held a vested remainder
the conveyance of which barred their issue, but the force of
the statement that "the common law of descents was preserved
in the statute of conveyances," is not so easily overcome.
Since this same statute of conveyances of which the court was
speaking was restored in 1865, it is astonishing to read the
dictum that by the statute of 1845, "this last vestige of the
system of feudal tenures was swept from our statute book."
Curiously enough, the court refrained from any examination
of its previously decided cases under this same statute, though
it did cite Burris v. Page and Farrar v. Christy. On the ques-
tion of primogeniture the case is not supported by Burris v.
Page, and it is in conflict with dicta in Emmerson v. Hughes,
Godman v. Simmons, Reed v. Lane, and Rozier v. Graham; on the
question of the vested nature of the remainder, it is opposed
to the dicta in Emmerson v. Hughes, Godman v. Simmons, Reed v.
Lane, and to the dictum if not the decision in Rozier v. Graham;
and the circumstance that the donee's children were born at
the time of the conveyance to the donee, while distinguishing
the case from Rozier v. Graham, does not distinguish it from
Emmerson v. Hughes and Godman v. Simmons."5
In the same year, Hall v. French 6 was decided; in which
no reference is made to Frame v. Humphreys, the court con-
tinually speaking of remaindermen, and the six children whose
grantee is allowed to recover, are not shown to have included
the eldest son, who, though the fact does not clearly appear,
was probably born before the conveyance to the mother in tail.
Under the interpretation placed on the habendum clause in
Utter v. Sidman," it is not clear that the statute of entails ap-
75. If Frame v. Humphreys adopts a new definition of a contingent
remainder (Kales, Future Interests, § 116), it is opposed to the cases cited
in note 39 supra.
76. (1901) 165 Mo. 430.
77. (1902) 170 Mo. 284. On p. 301, it is said, "The deed in ques-
tion granted to Mrs. Clark an estate for life only with a remainder in fee
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plied to the case. And in Chew v. Keller,7 where the statute
of entails must have applied, the court speaks of the deed's
having "vested a remainder in fee in the heirs" of the grantee,
but no attention is given to the nature of the estate created,
and "heirs" must have been used for "heirs of the body."
Miller v. Dunn9 presents the same proposition as Utter v. Sid-
man, the habendum clause, which contained the limitation to
the heirs of the body, being interpreted as creating a remainder
in such heirs. In both Miller v. Dunn and Utter v. Sidman, it
would seem that the statute of entails should have been ap-
plied to achieve a result apparently reached by interpretation
of habendum clauses without it." °
A dictum in Summet v. Realty Co.,"' where the statute of
1865 was erroneously applied, is to the effect that the statutory
remainder was a "contingent remainder in the children" of the
donee.
Cox v. Jones 2 is clear in holding that where an estate tail
was created in each of several daughters, "the heirs of their
respective bodies, alive at the life tenant's death, took a fee
simple absolute when the respective estates lapsed" (expired),
and is difficult to reconcile with Frame v. Humphreys. 3
Gray v. Ward 4 decided under the present statute is the
last word on its effect. A deed "to Sallie Gray and her heirs
by James Gray" was said "to vest in Sallie Gray a life estate
only, with remainder to her children then living and thereafter
to the heirs of her body." It was not determined whether this remainder
was vested or contingent, though it must have been contingent. Emmer-
son v. Hughes (1892) 110 Mo. 627.
78. (1902) 171 Mo. 215.
79. (1904) 184 Mo. 318.
80. Such a result was reached by applying the statute in Bone 0.
Tyrrell (1892) 113 Mo. 175.
81. (1907) 208 Mo. 501.
82. (1910) 229 Mo. 52.
83. In marshalling the established rules for the construction of
wills, Lamm, J., says, at p. 63: "The entailment of estates is obnoxious
to the policy of our laws. Therefore, if an estate tail be granted by will
or deed either by express words or by necessary implication, it is at once
struck down by our statute and another substituted for it, viz., an estate
for life to the first taker, remiander over in fee-simple absolute to the
next taker, nominated, or by the course of the common law." This
statement as to the statutory remainder is extremely hazy and unsatis-
factory.
84. (1911) 234 Mo. 291.
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born to her by her said husband," and during the life of Sallie
one of seven children (a child had died in infancy) was decreed.
"to have an undivided one-sixth interest in remainder, subject
to the life estate" of the mother. This is a recognition of*
special estates tail, and a repudiation of primogeniture. Ir
speaking of "the remainder vesting in her children then alive
and thereafter born," the court could not have meant it was a
vested remainder, else it would seem that the mother should
have inherited a portion of the share of the child who had died
in infancy.8" The date of the deed was not given, so that it
is impossible to say whether any children were living at the
time of the conveyance.
The foregoing decisions seem to isolate Frame v. Humph-
reys. It may be said with certainty that primogeniture does
not prevail since Gray v. Ward, and that part of Frame v. Humph-
reys would seem to have been overruled. Until Emmerson v.
Hughes and Rozier v. Graham are expressly repudiated, the
statutory remainder may, with practical certainty, be said to
be contingent so long as the donee in tail survives, and if they
should be repudiated a special definition for a contingent re-
mainder will have to be applied to this statutory interest.
5 8
If the remainder vests during the life of the donee, since Gray
v. Ward it must be subject to being divested, so that Frame
v. Humphreys cannot be law on this. If the remainder vests
where the donee has children at the time of the conveyance,
there would seem to be no reason why it should not vest where-
none exist at that time, when they are later born. 7
B. Under the statute of 1845.18
The same inquiries must again be made with reference to,
the remainder created by the following words of the statute:
"Upon the death of such grantee or devisee, the said lands and tene-
ments shall go and be vested in the children of such grantee or devisee."
85. A contingent remainderman may maintain a bill to quiet and:
determine a title. R. S. 1909, § 2535.
86. But cf., Heady v. Crouse (1906) 203 Mo. 100.
87. And the cases contain no reference to any distinction of this.
sort It can be of importance only in considering the validity of the re--
mainder over. Cox v. Jones (1910) 229 Mo. 52.
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The fact that the statute proceeds to dispose of the interest
of any child who may be dead at the time of the donee's death,
as the Statute of Descents would have disposed of it, is indi-
cative; and this does not exclude a reference to children dying
before, as well as to those dying after the conveyance. Under
this statute, a conveyance to A and the heirs of his body, if it
need not be read as, should have the effect of a conveyance to
A for life, and upon his death remainder to his children and the
issue (if such, and if none such, the heirs,) of any deceased
child.8 9 No question of the existence of primogeniture is here
presented. But it must be determined whether the remainder
is vested or contingent, and what is the effect of the death of a
child both before and after the conveyance during the life time
,of the donee.
This statute very plainly does not provide for the event of
the death of the donee without having had any children, for
the last clause, "and if there be no issue, then to his or her
heirs," refers to the issue and heirs of children of the donee, the
possessives "his" and "her" being used in apposition with
"him" and "her" in the preceding clause, "the part which
would have come to him or her.""0
The statute provides that the land "shall go and be vested"
upon the death of the donee, and the gift over on the death of any
child rather implies that it is not vested before that time. But
neither of these features necessarily impels the conclusion that
it is contingent while the donee is alive and after children are
born; the first may refer only to the time of enjoyment,"' as in
a gift "to A for life and at his death to B and his heirs" 5 -B
has a vested remainder in spite of the future words,9" and the sec-
ond may, so far as it effects no different results, only constitute
88. The material part of the statute is quoted supra. It has never
been contended that the statutory remainder is in only those children
who were alive at the time of the conveyance.
89. An adopted child cannot take under the statute. Clarkson v.
Hatton (1897) 143 Mo. 47.
90. Contra, Brown v. Rogers (1894) 125 Mo. 392. The different
'punctuation in the statute of 1855 did not change this meaning. Clark-
son v. Clarkson (1894) 125 Mo., 381, is contra.
91. Clarkson v. Clarkson (1894) 125 Mo. 381.
92. See Garth v. Arnold (1902) 115 Fed. 468, 474.
93. Byrne v. France (1895) 131 Mo. 639 Doe d. Poor v. Considine
,(1867) 6 Wall. 658; Gray Perpetuities (2nd ed.) § 103, note.
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the issue of the deceased child purchasers and takers of shifting
executory interests where they would otherwise have taken by
descent.
The statute was first applied in Chiles v. Bartleson,4 where
the lower court said that the remainder was in the heirs of the
body of the donee, and the higher court said the remainder was
in the children of the donee, but only the donee's interest was
in question and the case is of little authority because the date
of the testator's death is uncertain.
In Charles v. Patch,5 the remainder is said to be in the
heirs of the body of the donee, but this was not controverted
and no especial attention is given to the point.
Phillips v. LaForge5 permitted children of the donee to re-
cover the land from their parents' grantee, the donee having
died.
In Wood v. Kice7 the deed was dated June 3, 1865, and
the statute of 1855 was still in force. But the court erroneously
placed the case under the statute of 1889 (which is the same as.
that of 1865) and said that the conveyance gave a fee to the
heirs of the body of the donee, though this error did not affect
the result of the case.
Bone v. Tyrrell" applied the statute, but adds nothing,
though the court may have thought the remainder to be vested'
inasmuch as there is no reference to the possibility of alienating
contingent remainders, a doctrine established at the same term.
of court in Godman v. Simmons.99
In Clarkson v. Clarkson,"' a child or children of the donee-
had died prior to the conveyance, but as the donee "had no,
children or their descendents living, either at the date of the
deed or at his death, the remainder vested in his brothers and
sisters and the heirs of those who are dead, he having no father
or mother living at his death." And in a later opinion on the
94. (1855) 21 Mo. 344.
95. (1885) 87 Mo. 450.
96. (1886) 89 Mo. 72 . The statute of 1845 applied to equitable as
well as legal fees tail. The statute of uses would seem to have operated
in the principal case.
97. (1890) 103 Mo. 329.
98. (1892) 113 Mo. 175.
99. (1892) 113 Mo. 122.
100. (1894) 125 Mo. 381.
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same deed,' it is said to be beyond the power of the donee "to
take away the statutory estate so created and vested in his
brothers and sisters, if he had no bodily heirs, and confer the
same upon an adopted child." This is a clear decision to the
effect that the heirs of a child dead before the conveyance do not
take under the statute, at least where he left no descendants
who lived beyond the conveyance. The interpretation of the
last clause as conferring the estate on the heirs of the donee,
has already been noticed and disapproved. Even accepting
this interpretation it is indefensible to speak of a vested interest
in the heirs prior to the donee's death, and in Brown v. Rogers10 2
this is perceived, but the interpretation is extended so as to
invalidate a gift over which would seem to have been unobjec-
tionable as a contingent remainder, or if not, as an executory
devise.
Hunter v. Patterson,0 3 which seems to have been placed
erroneously under the statute of 1889, adds nothing. Frame
,v. Humphreys0 4 has a dictum to the effect that if the statute of
1845 had been in force, the deed in that case would have created
a contingent remainder which "would not have vested, until
the death of Mary Ann Walker [the donee], when it would have
vested in her then living children and grandchildren." This is
verily a paradox, for it is much easier to read the statute of
1845 as creating a vested remainder than to give that effect to
the statute of 1825.
But Garth v. Arnold,'0° where the donee had children at the
date of the conveyance, clearly held the remainder to be vested
in the children as a class as soon as any were born, though the
opinion of the lower court'08 contained a statement to the ef-
fect that "on the death of Ann [the donee] the estate in re-
mainder vested in the surviving heirs of her body," evidently
overlooking the difference between the statutes of 1845 and
101. Clarkson v. Hatton (1897) 143 Mo. 47.
102. (1894) 125 Mo. 392.
103. (1898) 142 Mo. 310.
104. (1901) 164 Mo. 336, 346.
105. (1902) 115 Fed. 468. Preston v. Smith (1886) 26 Fed. 884,
*was under the earlier statute but involved only the nature of the remain-
,der over.
106. Arnold v. Garth (1901) 106 Fed. 13.
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1865. No applicable authority is cited by the higher court, 0 7
though its opinion professes to have been formed "in view of
the local decisions on the question."
In Miller v. Ensminger"°8 no reference is made to Garth v.
Arnold, but there is a plain dictum that "an estate tail by dis-
position of the statute, was an estate for life and upon the death
of [the donee] descended in fee to his children living at the
time of his death." The plaintiffs in Miller v. Ensminger may
have been the only children of the donee-the fact does not
appear.
The statute now being considered should have been applied
in Summet v. Realty Co., 109 but the error in placing that case
under the later statute did not affect the result.
Charles v. White'" is to the effect that a deed to five daugh-
ters and "the heirs of their bodies forever" conveyed a life
estate to the said daughters, with a remainder over to their re-
spective children "born and to be born." But in Charles v.
Pickens,"' the same deed was said to have "had the effect of
conveying a life estate to each of the daughters with a remain-
der over to 'the heirs of their bodies,' " the difference not be-
ing perceived.
This state of the authorities does not answer the questions
presented. It cannot be known whether descendants of a
child of the donee who died before the conveyance will take,
though they are included in the statute, nor what effect the
death of such descendants prior to the death of the donee will
have on what they may possibly take. And if Garth v. Arnold
be adopted by the state court, a qualification must be made on
the interpretation of the last clause of the statute established
by Clarkson v. Clarkson, for if the donee has children to take a
vested remainder at the time of the conveyance, the statute
can hardly be held to divest it on their non-survival without
issue in favor of the donee's heirs.
107. Farrar v. Christy (1857) 24 Mo. 453, being under a different
statute.
108. (1904) 182 Mo. 195.
109. (1907) 208 Mo. 501.
110. (1908) 214 Mo. 187.
111. (1908) 214 Mo. 212.
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If after the death of a child without issue the donee should
die leaving children, a conflict between Garth v. Arnold and
Clarkson v. Clarkson will be presented necessitating a repudia-
tion of one or the other. A strict adherence to Clarkson v.
v. Clarkson must eventually result in a holding that the child-
ren of the donee, and their issue in the event of their deaths,
take remainders contingent on their surviving the donee, which
holding will be consistent with the clear dicta of Frame v.
Humphreys and Miller v. Ensminger. If the children have a
vested remainder in any case, prior to the donee's death, it
should make no difference whether they are born at the time of
the conveyance, or later."2
If a child should die without issue prior to the death of the
donee, whether his heirs shall be determined as of the time of
his, or the donee's death, must depend upon the ultimate fate
of Garth v. Arnold." 3
IV.
THE REMAINDER OVER.
To A and the heirs of his body, but if A should die with-
out heirs of his body, to B and his heirs. Apart from modern
statutes, B has a valid remainder which may be enjoyed in
possession whenever the line of the heirs of the body of A fails.
Being vested," 4 it cannot be objectionably remote. The words
which apparently introduce a precedent contingency, only
prescribe the determination of the preceding estate.
Now the modern statutes of entails"5 do not expressly
affect this remainder over. Whatever doubt may have arisen
on this point under the statute of 1816 which purported to
"vest the fee simple in the person having the first reversion or
remainder in the said estate, after the life estate is determin-
ed, "11 it is impossible to contend that the holder of the ultimate
112. Supra, note 88.
113. 2 Jarman on Wills (5th Amer. ed.) 616.
114. Gray, Perpetuities (2nd ed.) §§ 111, 447.
115. This is not a misnomer where, as in Missouri, the entailing
feature is preserved for one generation.
116. 1 Mo. Terr. Laws, p. 436.
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remainder is a person "to whom the estate tail would first pass"
within the meaning of the statutes of 1825, of 1835, and of 1865.
It is therefore difficult to know what was meant in Farrar v.
Christy"' when the court said that "the words employed in the
act sufficiently indicate that another than the heir in tail may
be the first taker according to the course of the common law
by virtue of the grant."
But in conferring the "fee simple absolute" upon the
taker of the statutory remainder, all the statutes, that of 1845
as well as the others named, attempt a disposition so complete
as to leave nothing for the ultimate remainderman to enjoy.
It is probable that the framers of these statutes had in mind
cases in which the ultimate interest was undisposed of and
would therefore pass to a reversioner. If under the statutes
an estate tail first comes into existence," 8 such a destruction of
vested remainders and reversions already in existence would be
unconstitutional; and this interpretation of the statutes ought
logically to mean the absolute invalidity of the ultimate interest
as an attempt to create a vested remainder after the statutory
remainder in fee." 9 But on the better view of the statutes, that
they operate "only to cause one form of language to be equiv-
alent to another," the limitation now under consideration
should be read, "to A for life, remainder in fee to the heirs of
his body, and if A should die without heirs of his body to B and
his heirs."' 2  The ultimate interest must then be supported if
at all, as a contingent remainder, or as a shifting executory in-
terest.
What is the nature of B's interest? And to what extent is
it valid? A further task of construction-the determination
of the definiteness or indefiniteness of the failure of A's issue on
which B is to take-must precede an attempt to answer these
questions. Then three situations must be studied: (1) where A
117. (1857) 24 Mo. 453, 469.
118. Spencer v. Spruell (1902) 196 Il1. 119; Kales, Future Interests
in Illinois, § 115.
119. See the dictum in Brown v. Rogers (1894) 125 Mo. 392.
120. This is under the statute of 1825. The statute of 1845 would
make it read: "To A for life, remainder to his children and the issue (if
none such, the heirs) of any deceased child, and if A should die without
children, to B. and his heirs." But see Clarkson v. Clarkson (1894) 125
Mo. 381; Brown v. Rogers (1894) 125 Mo. 392.
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never has children who may take the statutory remainder; (2)
where he has such children, but they are born after the convey-
ance; (3) where he has such children at the time of the convey-
ance.
121
Is the limitation to B on a definite or an indefinite failure
of issue? 2  Under the Missouri statute of 1845123,-providing
that
"Where a remainder * * * shall be limited * * * to take
effect on the death of any person without heirs, or heirs of the body, or
without issue, the words 'heirs' or 'issue' shall be construed to mean heirs
or issue living at the death of the person named as ancestor"
-it would seem that all failures of issue are to be construed as
definite. For the term "remainder" in the statute has been
held to include an executory devise. 2 4 The statute is so per-
emptory that it would probably be applied though an indefinite
failure of issue were plainly intended.'
1. Where A never has children who may take the statutory
remainder.' The statutory remainder must, on any proper
definition, be contingent on the birth, and perhaps the survival,
of issue, throughout its existence. Since a vested remainder
cannot follow a contingent remainder in fee,'27 B cannot have
a vested remainder. But since B's interest may, in an event,
immediately follow A's life estate, B must have a contingent
remainder of Fearne's second class, 28 for "no limitation is [to
121. This classification is adopted from Professor Kales' article, 13
Yale Law Journal 267.
122. On this general question of construction see Lewis, Perpetui-
ties, c. 15, 174-407; Forth v. Chapman (1720) 1 P. Wms. 663.
123. R. S. 1845, c. 32, § 6. Now, R. S., 1909, § 2873. It has been
in force continuously since 1845.
124. Gannon v. Albright (1904) 183 Mo. 238, 262; Yocum v. Siler(1900) 160 Mo. 281. See also Naylor v. Godman (1891) 109 Mo. 543;
Faust's Admrx. v. Birner (1860) 30 Mo. 417.
125. 5 Kent's Commentaries (14th ed.) 280, quoted in Gannon v.
Albright (1904) 183 Mo. 238, 258. The English Wills Act contained a
proviso: "Unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will, by rea-
-son of such person having a prior estate tail." 1 Vict. c. 26, § 29.
126. Here it will make no difference whether the statute of 1825 or
of 1845 is in force at the time of the conveyance. But in Brown v. Rogers
(1894) 125 Mo. 392, the gift over was held to be void altogether.
127. Loddington v. Kime (1551) 1 Salk. 224; 1 Tiffany, Real Prop-
erty 287.
128. 1 Fearne, Contingent Remainders 6. "An uncertain event,
collateral to the determination of the preceding estate, is to precede the
remainder."
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be] construed as executory which can take effect as a remain-
der."'129 It is a case of contingent remainders in double aspect.
Even if the statute making the failure of issue definite should
not be applied, 1 0 still the indefinite failure, being broader than,
must include, a definite failure, and since in the event of a
definite failure the limitation to B would have to take effect
as a contingent remainder while in the event of a later indefinite
failure it would have to take effect as a shifting executory in-
terest, the two may be separated under the rule of Evers v.
Challis'I and the contingent remainder to B is not invalid for
remoteness, though the shifting executory interest on an in-
definite failure is fatally remote.
2. Where A has children who are capable of taking the statu-
tory remainder, but they are born subsequently to the conveyance.
Prior to the birth of a child, the situation is the same as in (1),
and- if the proper definition"3 2 of a contingent remainder be ap-
plied, the statutory remainder under the statute of 1825 will be
held contingent, and the situation will remain as in (1) after
children are born. But under the Frame v. Humphreys' ap-
plication of the statute of 1825, and under the statute of 1845,
if Garth v. Arnold' be followed, the statutory remainder be-
comes vested on the birth of a child, and it is then impossible
for B to have a contingent remainder, for a contingent remain-
der cannot follow a vested remainder in fee. Logically, if the
statutory remainder under the statute of 1825 is a vested re-
mainder prior to A's death, it would seem that on the same defi-
nition B's ultimate remainder should be vested prior to the
birth of children. Whether B's remainder be vested or con-
tingent prior to the birth of A's child, it ceases to exist as a re-
mainder upon the happening of that event and B can there-
after have only a shifting executory interest. It is difficult to
129. Challis, Real Property (3rd ed.) 123.
130. It was overlooked in Harbison v. Swan (1874) 58 Mo. 147,
and was not in force when the conveyance in Farrar v. Christy (1857) 24
Mo. 456, was made.
131. (1859) 7 H. L. C. 531.
132. Emison v. Whittlesey (1874) 55 Mo. 254; Delassus v. Gatewood
(1879) 71 Mo. 371; Emmerson v. Hughes (1874) 110 Mo. 627; Tindall v.
Tindall (1902) 167 Mo. 218; Heady v. Crouse (1907) 203 Mo. 100; Lich
v. Lich (1911) 158 Mo. App. 400.
133. (1901) 164 Mo. 336.
134. (1902) 115 Fed. 468.
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see how a remainder of any sort can be converted into a shift-
ing executory interest by an event happening subsequently to
its creation as a remainder. The destruction of contingent re-
mainders is familiar enough, but such transformation is un-
known. Our law has never said "that any kind of a future
interest may be turned into any other kind at any time by any
event if necessary in order to carry out the intention of the cre-
ator of the interest. ,135
Can it be said that B had a shifting executory interest all
along, in addition to this remainder? If a child should be born
subsequently to the conveyance, and should die while A is yet
living, and if as was suggested in Rozier v. Graham'3" it be held
to have had a vested remainder which was divested upon its
death, B's shifting executory interest would become a remain-
der, and this in turn might be defeated by the birth of a second
child whose death in the lifetime of its father could confer
nothing on B, for his shifting executory interest must have been
exhausted on the death of the first child." 7 Is it not therefore
entirely possible that under the Garth v. Arnold view of the
statute of 1845 and the Frame v. Humphreys view of the statute
of 1825,138 the birth of a child to A entirely destroys B's ulti-
mate interest, whether it be vested or contingent prior to such
birth?1 9 Such a result my be avoided by a repudiation of
Frame v. Humphreys for cases arising under the present statute
of 1865, but it may be unavoidable for cases arising under the
statute of 1845.140
Here, as in (1) the indefiniteness of the failure of A's issue
does not seem to be material. But it must be remembered that
if in the event of either a definite or an indefinite failure of issue
the ultimate interest will take effect as a shifting executory
135. Quoting Professor Kales' query, 13 Yale Law Journal 279.
136. (1898) 146 Mo. 352.
137. This hypothesis is under the statute of 1825, not under the
statute of 1845.
138. See the discussion of these cases, supra.
139. The court which decided Brown v. Rogers (1894) 125 Mo. 392,
may have had in mind this reasoning, but it is nowhere expressed in the
decision.
140. In Brown v. Rogers (1894) 125 Mo. 392, this question was not
presented for the ultimate interest was given "to surviving heirs," which
the context shows to mean "to surviving children," and the plaintiff's
mother did not survive any of her sisters who had children.
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interest, then the rule of Evers v. Challis will not apply and a
separation will be impossible though remoteness result.
3. Where A's children are living at the time of the conveyance.
If the children take a contingent remainder, contingent on their
surviving A as heirs of his body, B has an alternate contingent
remainder which is valid whether the failure be considered defi-
nite or indefinite. This is the proper result under the statute
of 1825. But if the statutory remainder be held to be vested,
following Frame v. Humphreys, and subject to being divested,
B has a shifting executory interest which might become a con-
tingent (not properly a vested) remainder in the event of the
death of A's children during A's lifetime, but which could not
thereafter be reconverted into an executory interest. If the
children survive A, of course B's interest would be void for re-
moteness, even if he could take in spite of the statute as to
failures of issue, for he could not then take as remainderman.
Under the statute of 1845, if Garth v. Arnold be followed,
B has a shifting executory interest which, whether the failure
be construed to be definite or indefinite, must be invalid unless
it may be converted into a contingent remainder by the death
.of A's children in his lifetime; which is very doubtful, for what
would be the effect upon the remainder which the statute con-
fers upon the issue or heirs of deceased children? It is entirely
possible that under the statute of 1845, the existence of children
at the time of the conveyance, or their later birth, would wholly
destroy the ultimate interest, though it be limited on a definite
failure of issue.' 41 This is the position taken by Mr. Zane. 42
The actual decisions are at variance with the foregoing
conclusions.
In Farrar v. Christy'4 3 two separate tracts of land had been
conveyed in 1832 to Edmund and Howard respectively, with a
proviso that if either should die without issue, the survivor
should take the land of the one so dying, and if both should die
without issue, the land should revert to the grantor's heirs.
141. But in Brown v. Rogera (1894) 125 Mo. 392, one donee had
died without ever having had issue.
142. Article on Determinable Fees, 17 Harvard Law Review 297,
310. But this writer failed to perceive the difference between the Mis-
souri statutes of 1845 and 1825.
143. (1857) 24 Mo. 456. One of three judges dissented.
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Neither Edmund nor Howard ever had issue. After implying
estates tail in Edmund and Howard, the court read the word
I"survivor" to mean "other," and held that each took a vested
remainder in the land of the other "subject to be divested by
the birth of issue of the first grantee of the estate tail." This
error was due to a misconception that "if the fee simple was
judged to be in abeyance," the ultimate interest would fail on
the death of its owner-such a contingent remainder might
have passed to the heirs of the owner ;144 and to a misinterpreta-
tion of the statute of 1825, by which it was made to confer the
statutory remainder on the holder of the ultimate interest be-
cause it was "intended that the fee simple should pass pres-
ently." The gift over on the death of both without issue was
not noticed-there is probably no ground upon which it might
have been saved from fatal remoteness. The conveyance here
was prior to the statute of 1845, making such failures of issue
definite, but the rule of Evers v. Challis might have been ap-
plied to save the separate gifts over from remoteness, for it was
probably an indefinite failure as a result of the meaning given
to the word "survivor."'" Following Farrar v. Christy,
whether the statutory remainder became vested on the birth
or survival of children, the ultimate interest must be wholly
destroyed by their birth, for a vested remainder cannot be
converted into a contingent remainder.
Harbison v. Swan 4' is much like Farrar v. Christy. Two
tracts of land were devised to Harriett and Juliet, respectively,
with a proviso that on the death of either without issue, "the
part devised to the one deceased to descend to the survivor,"
and on the death of both without issue, both tracts should go
to the heirs of Mary and Clarissa. The testator died in 1852,
but the statute making the failure of issue definite was over-
looked. So estates tail were held to have been created. Har-
riett never had issue-so, following Farrar v. Christy, Juliet
took a vested remainder in Harriett's tract "subject to be di-
144. 1 Fearne, Contingent Remainders 366.
145. Compare with Farrar v. Christy, Chapin v. Nott (1903) 203 II.
341, which was decided when the New York statutory definition of a con-
tingent remainder prevailed in Illinois.
146. (1874) 58 Mo. 147. It was decided solely on the authority of
Farrar v. Christy.
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vested on the birth of children to Harriett," which condition
did not happen. Juliet had a son, living at the death of the
testator, who survived her-it was held that "Harriett's in-
terest in the estate of Juliet ceased." But Juliet's son did not
survive Harriett, and since the failure of issue was treated as
indefinite for the implication of estates tail, the shifting execu-
tory interest in Harriett should have received some attention.147
In Preston v. Smith 4 ' the plaintiff who claimed through a
devisee of one to whom the will purported to give an interest
after an estate tail, sought to protect his title against acts of the
original donee in tail who was of advanced age and without
issue. The bill was dismissed as "an effort to establish a doubt-
ful title" in equity, but the court said by way of dictum that it
was a "very doubtful question as to where the remainder in
fee is vested." Though apparently a refusal to follow Farrar
v. Christy, the fact that the gift over, as well as the original gift,
purported to be of an estate tail may have been the basis of the
doubt.
In Wood v. Kice49 the holder of the ultimate interest is
admitted to have an estate, but there is no attempt to define it.
It does not appear whether the donee in tail had issue, and it
was an equitable estate tail.'
Brown v. Rogers 5' squarely presents the question, under
the statute of 1845. After a devise to his daughters and the
heirs of their bodies, the testator gave the property, in the
event of any daughter's dying without issue of her body, to
his "then surviving heirs, the same to vest absolutely in them
and the heirs of their body." The intention was probably,
"in case of a failure of issue to any of the devisees, to have the
estate pass to the other devisees and the heirs of their bodies,"
147. This latter was probably void for remoteness, since the-word
"'survivor" was read as "other." In Thompson v. Craig (1876) 64 Mo.
312, the authority of Farrar v. Christy and Harbison v. Swan was recognized
by way of dictum.
148. (1886) 26 Fed. 884.
149. (1890) 103 Mo. 329.
150. Though equitable contingent remainders need not fit immedi-
ately on to prior equitable estates, and are therefore remote where legal
remainders would be valid, the fact is unimportant where, as here, the
nature of the contingency requires that it must happen at or before the
expiration of the prior estate, or not at all.
151. (1894) 125 Mo. 392.
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so that "surviving heirs" may be read as "surviving children."
Some of the daughters died without issue, one on the day of
her father's death, though whether before or after her father's
death does not appear; if after, as the fact must have been, the
plaintiffs, who were the children of the second daughter to die,
were clearly entitled to the statutory remainder in the portion
of their aunt's lands to which their mother was entitled for life
by force of her remainder in tail. But, curiously the court
held that
"The attempt of the testator * * * to follow up the estate tail
first created, with a succession of others limited upon cross remainders,
* * * is in direct contravention of the clearly expressed intention of
the statute. After the devises were made to his daughters and the heirs
of their bodies, his power of disposal ended."
This does not seem to have been put on the Clarkson v.
Clarkson interpretation of the statute of entails of 1845-
though such an interpretation be accepted, it ought still to be
possible for a testator to create a contingent remainder which
would cut off the contingent statutory remainder in the heirs
of the donee. The judgment in Brown v. Rogers may be rested
entirely on the adverse possession of the defendants, 52 other-
wise the plaintiffs must have had some interest as heirs of their
aunts, and of children of aunts, who died after the death of the
plaintiffs' mother.
In Cox v. Jones' where there was a devise to a daughter
and to the heirs of her body, but if she should die without heirs
of her body, then to the testator's other heirs, the court said
by way of dictum, "it created a life estate with a remainder
over in fee (in the event of the death of the devisee without
heirs) in the heirs of [the testator] mentioned in the will, and,
in the event the devisee died with heirs of her body in being,
then in them." This would seem to be a proper recognition
152. Brown v. Rogers was followed in Buford v. Kerr (1898) 86 Fed.
97, and (1898) 90 Fed. 513, the higher federal court holding that its de-
cision was "in accordance with the doctrine announced in the previous
cases" of Farrar v. Christy, Harbison v. Swan, and Thompson v. Craig-
but such is not a fact as the learned reader will readily perceive, and those
cases were under a different statute. In Cross v. Hoch (1899) 149 Mo.
325, there is no suggestion of the invalidity of the remainder over, though
the event had not happened. See also, Prosser v. Hardesty (1890) 101
Mo. 593.
153. (1910) 229 Mo. 52.
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of the alternate contingent remainders, but the slight attention
given the point hardly warrants the conclusion that the court
intended to intimate a willingness to overrule the earlier cases.
This state of the authorities does not admit of any satis-
factory conclusions concerning the remainder over. It is to be
hoped that the question will receive the attention which it
merits when it again arises, and since Farrar v. Christy and
Harbison v. Swan were both decided without reference to the
statute of 1845 concerning failures of issue, and Brown v.
Rogers under the statute of entails of 1845, the Missouri court
is free to deal with the remainder over without the embar-
rassment occasioned by the premises of these decided cases.
It is submitted that the way is now clear for the court to
say, under the statute of 1865, that primogepiture does not
obtain; that the statutory remainder is contingent in the
donee's heirs of the body in general, or in special heirs of the
body if designated; and that the ultimate interest is an alter-
nate contingent remainder, limited on a definite failure of issue.
The few cases which may yet arise under the statute of 1845,
will present more difficulty, but it is not too late to correct the
error of Clarksonv. Clarkson and to adopt the view of Garthv.
Arnold that the statutory remainder becomes vested in the
donee's children (or their issue or heirs) at the time of the con-
veyance, or as soon as any child is born. It should then be
held that the ultimate interest will immediately perish upon
the statutory remainder's becoming vested.
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